The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison With the Restatement by Kenworthey, Charles E.
Volume 54 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 54, 
1949-1950 
1-1-1950 
The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison 
With the Restatement 
Charles E. Kenworthey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Charles E. Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison With the 
Restatement, 54 DICK. L. REV. 109 (1950). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol54/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE PRIVATE NUISANCE CONCEPT IN PENNSYLVANIA:
A COMPARISON WITH THE RESTATEMENT
By
HON. CHARLES E. KENWORTHEY*
One legal writer has said that "there is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant
all things to all m'en, and has been applied indiscriminately from an alarming
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie . . Few terms have afforded so ex-
cellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catch-
word as a substitute for any analysis of the problem .... ."I
In 1861, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Pottstown Gas
Company v. Aiuphyf rendered a brief opinion which is a good example of this
judicial tendency to "seize upon a legal catchword as a substitute for any analysis
of the problem. " 3 There the defendant constructed a sunken tank from which
ammonia seeped into Murphy's well, polluting it. Murphy brought an action on
the case for nuisance, and at the end of the trial, the gas company submitted a
point for charge that it could not be held liable absent a finding of negligence in
the construction of the tank and in the carrying on of its works. The lower court
refused to so charge, and a judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal, the
Supreme Court observing that "the [lower court] was right in saying that this
was not a question of negligence, but of nuisance ... "4
Legal scholars had done little5 to assist the courts in finding their way out
of the labyrinth until Chapter 40 of the Restatement of Torts was published in
1939.6 A nuisance, according to Blackstone, was "anything that work-tth hurt,
inconvenience, or damage [to a man's lands or tenements]."'7 Conceivably in-
cluded within this definition would be a bolt of lightning which destroys a barn
or a flood which carries the old homestead downstream. And Professor Cooley
described a nuisance as "anything wrongfully done or permitted which injures
*A.B., 1922, University of Pennsylvania; L.LB. 1925, University of Pennsylvania. Judge,
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1941-1944. Member, 1940-1944, Chairman, 1944 - , Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's Procedural Rules Committee. Member, American Law Institute; member,
Committee for Annotation, American Law Institute's Restatement of Trusts; member, Pennsylvania
Committee on American Law Institute's Code of Evidence. Member, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
and American Bar Associations. Formerly Chancellor of Philadelphia Bar Association.
1 PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 549-550 (1941).
2 39 Pa. 257 (1861).
a PaossER, op cit. supra note 1, at 550.
4 39 Pa. at 263.
5 PaossER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 551.
It was not until 1875 that a treatise was written on the law of nuisance. See the preface
to WOOD, LAW OF NuIsANcEs (1st ed. 1875), where the author states that he was a "pioneer
in this 'wilderness' of law ... "
6 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 214-312 (1939).
7 1 BL. COMM. *215-216.
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another in the enjoyment of his legal rights." s  This definition could well be
applied to the cause of action which arises in favor of a husband when another
alienates the affections of his wife.9
One of the most recent attempts by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
define nuisance appears in Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.10 as follows:
"In legal phraseology, the term 'nuisance' is applied to that class
of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful
use by a person of his own property, real 6r personal, or from his own
improper, indecent, or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruc-
tion or injury to the right of another, or the public, and producing such
material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt that the law will
presume a consequent damage . . . Nuisance is distinguishable from
negligence . . .The distinction between trespass and nuisance consists
in the former being a direct infringement of one's right of property,
while, in the latter, the infringement is the result of an act which is not
wrongful in itself, but only in the consequences which may flow from
it.""1
SOURCES OF CONFUSION
Because the term "nuisance" has been accorded such a diversified meaning
by the courts, a proper understanding of the cases requires a preliminary examina-
tion of the manner in which the term has been used. This is true even though
th scope of this article has been limited to an analysis of the Pennsylvania de-
cisions.
In the introductory note to Chapter 40 of the RestatemenA'2 it is pointed out
that this diversification of meaning given to the word "nuisance" may be basically
attributable to certain well defined causes for confusion. Hence it has been con-
sidered appropriate not only to enumerate some of those sources but in addition
occasionally to employ the very language which appears in thL introductory note
to Chapter 40.
Nalture of Interest Invaded
A misunderstanding of the scope of private nuisance has sometimes led to
the inclusion, within that term, of wrongs which properly are not so classified.
8 3 COOLEY, LAW OF ToRTs 5398 (4th ed. 1932).
9 For other definitions, see JoYcE, LAw OF NuIsANCEs §2 (1906); 39 Am. JuL, NuI-
SANCES 12 (1942). Compare Winfield, Nuisance as Tort, 4 CAMB. L. J. 189, 190 (1931); SA.
mOND, LAW OF ToRrs 190 (3d ed. 1912).
10 341 Pa. 379, 19 A.2d 362 (1941).
11 Id. at 381, 19 A.2d. at 363. This definition had its inception in WooD, op. cit. supra
note 5. For an amusing comparison, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 388 (1926):
"A nuisance may be merely the right thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead
of the barnyard."
12 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 215-225 (1939).
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Historically, the action for a private nuisance originated in the assize of nuisance,'3
which was complementary to the assize of novel disseisin and was invented to
provide redress where the injury did not constitute a disseisin but rather involved
an indirect damage to the land through an interference with its use and enjoy-
ment.14
Thus, private nuisance is properly limited to an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land' 5 and is a wrong only to persons who have property rights
or privileges in the land.'
8
There are various types of tortious conduct. Generally speaking, liability
in tort exists where an act which causes harm is either intentional and unreason-
able or unintentional and negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous. But in determin-
ing whether tort liability properly belongs in the field of private nuisance, the
determination is not governed by the particular type of tortious conduct nor by
the nature of the means used to cause the harm. 11 The feature that gives unity to
the law of nuisance is the type of interest invaded-the nature of the harm-
namely, interest in the use and enjoyment of land. 18
It is confusing to think of private nuisance as itself a type of liability-forming
conduct, and to contrast it with negligence." o Tho Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has been a persistent transgressor in its lip service to the dogma: "It is not a
question of negligence, but of nuisance." 20 This confusion has undoubtedly arisen
from the fact that most tortious interferences with the use and enjoyment of the
land are intentional.
An invasion of a person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land
by any type of liability-forming conduct is a private nuisance.21 The invasion
18 The assize of nuisance was invented in the twelfth century. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 218
(1939); McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 2 U. OF FLA. L. Rav.
27 (1948) ; Winfield, op. cit. supra note 9.
14 The assize of novel disseisen was available only for an act which interfered with the
plaintiff's possession of his land. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 9. Consequently, a land owner
was without a remedy for a non-trespassory invasion of his interest in use and enjoyment of land
until the assize of nuisance was devised to fill "a gap for which novel disseisen was useless."
Winfield, op. cit. supra note 9. The assize of nuisance was limited in scope to actions between
freeholders. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 156 (1925).
Early in the seventeenth century, the assize of nuisance was replaced by an action on
the case for nuisance. McRae, op. cit. supra note 9. Compare Barnet v. Ihrie, 17 S. & R. 174
(Pa. 1828), holding that the assize of nuisance still existed in Pennsylvania at that late date.
25 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 219 (1939).
18 Ibid.
17 Id. at 220.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 222.
20 In Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861) the "not a question of negli-
gence but of nuisance" rule was formulated. For cases repeating and relying upon this theory, see
Stokes v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 214 Pa. 415, 63 A. 1028 (1906); Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining
Company, 186 Pa. 604, 40 A. 834 (1898) ; Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26
A. 644 (1893) ; Farver v. American Car & Foundry Co., 24 Pa. Super. 579 (1904). These cases
will be discussed throughout the article,
21 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 222.
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that subjects a person to liability may be either intentional or unintentional. If
the invasion is intentional it creates liability if it is unrleasonable under the circum-
stances of the particular case.22 If it is unintentional it creates liability if it is
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.
23
Actions for Damages Distinguished from Suits for Injunction
A frequent cause for confusion is the tendency of courts to cite cases in equity
as precedents in actions at law without regard for their differences. 24 Considera-
tions often enter into the determination of the right to an injunction that are in-
applicable or have less weight in determining the right to damages.2 5 It is one
thing to say that a defendant should pay damages for the harm his factory is caus-
ing, but it is a different thing to say that he must close his factory if the harm
cannot be stopped. For the purpose of determining liability for damages for
private nuisance, conduct may be regarded as unreasonable even though its utility
is great and the amount of harm is relatively small. But for the purpose of de-
termining whether the said conduct should be enjoined, additional factors must
be considered. It may be reasonable to continue an important activity if payment
is made for the harm it is causing, but unreasonable to continue it without paying.
2 6
Thus, denial of relief by way of injunction is not always a precedent for
denial of relief by way of damages. Consequently, liability for damages should
be separately dealt with.
Private Nuisance - Trespass Distinguished
Courts have frequently failed to distinguish between the invasion of an in-
terest in the exclusive possession of land and the interest in the use and enjoyment
of it. An actionable invasion of the former is a trespass, and was remediable at
common law by action of trespass; an actionable invasion of the latter is private
nuisance, and was remediable at common law by an action on the case.
27
Although an invasion of possession of land automatically involves some in-
terference with its use and enjoyment, and liability for trespass has traditionally
22 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
24 Id. at 223. For some Pennsylvania cases illustrating this tendeticy, see McKees Rocks
Borough v. Rennekamp Supply Co., 344 Pa. 443, 25 A.2d 710 (1942), citing Green v. Sun Com-
pany, 32 Pa. Super. 521 (1907) (trespass for damages); Quinn v. American Spiral Spring &
Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928), citing Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy, 39 Pa.
257 (1861) and Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893); Price v.
Grantz, 118 Pa. 402, 11 A. 794 (1893); Schneider v. Sweeney, 66 D. & C. 437 (Pa. 1948).
25 A chancellor may give decided weight to the factor of extensive community benefit.
Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924) ; Collins v. Wayne
Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 345 (1924) semble. Contra: Quinn v. American Spiral Spring
& Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928). But to a court of law, however, this factor may
be immaterial. Green v. Sun Company, 32 Pa. Super. 521 (1907). But cf. Tuckachinsky v. Le-
high & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, 199 Pa. 515, 49 A. 308 (1901) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 455 (1886).
26 4 RESTATEMENT, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 224.
27 Id. at 225.
THE PRIVATE NUISANCE CONCEPT IN PENNSYLVANIA
included liability for such incidental harms, there are important differences in the
two forms of liability. In the interest of clarity, the distinction between them
should be preserved.
28
Nuisance Per Se and Naisances in Fact
A nuisance per se has been defined as one which is a nuisance "at all times
and under any circumstances. " 29 It has been said that a nuisance in fact, on the
other hand, is one which becomes such "by reason of [its] location, surrounding
circumstances, and the manner in which the acts complained of are done."8 0
The Pennsylvania courts have employed the terms "nuisance per se" and
"nuisance in fact" in a variety of situations. A fertilizer plants' and a barbed
wire fence3 2 have been held to be nuisances per se, while a swarm of bees, 88 a
barking dog,3 4 and the malicious use of a marimba 5 have been said to be nuisances
in fact.
It may well be doubted that any court would say that a fertilizer plant located
in the middle of a desert is a nuisance per se in spite of the definition that it
is one which is a nuisance "at all times and under any circumstances." 36 And if
nuisances per se as well as nuisances in fact are dependent for their existence on
surrounding circumstances, the accepted distinction between them is a "filament
too fine to be disentangled"3 7 by an ordinary mind.83
The confusion which centers about the term nuisance per se has not always
b'een helped by attempts to clarify it. In Nesbit v. Riesenmnan,39 it was stated that
whether a nuisance is a nuisance per se "depends on the evidence showing the
28 Ibid.
29 Pennsylvania Company v. Sun Company, 290 Pa. 404, 138 A. 909 (1927); McGuirk,
An Outline of the Law of Nuisance in its Relation to Real Property, 11 DETROIT L. REv. 189,
190 (1928); 46 C. J. NuISANCES 15 (1928).
80 Amsterdam v. Dupont Powder Co., 62 Pa. Super. 314 (1916); McGuirk, op. cit. supra
note 29; 46 C. J., NuisANcEs 85 (1928). A third type of nuisance is said to be "those which in
their nature may be nuisances but as to which there may be honest differences of opinion in im-
partial minds." 39 Am. JuR., NUISANCES 16 (1942); McGuirk, op. cit. supra note 29.
81 Evans v. Reading Chemical Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 702 (1894).
82 Bower v. Watsontown Borough, 1 Dist. 116 (Pa. 1892).
89 Holden v. Lewis, 56 D. & C. 639 (1946).
84 Beechler v. Rothenberger, 53 D. & C. 235 (Pa. 1945).
85 In Collier v. Ernst, 46 D. & C. I (Pa. 1942), the following injunction went out:
"1. Respondent . . . is hereby, perpetually enjoined from playing 'Jingle Bells' with the in-
tention and for the purpose of annoying . . . complainant ....
"2. Respondent . . . is hereby perpetually enjoined from playing 'When Irish Eyes Are
Smiling' . . . for the purpose of annoying . . . Leo J. Kelly.
"3. Respondent . . . is hereby perpetually enjoined from playing 'Anchors Aweigh'
for the purpose of annoying and disturbing any naval officer.
"4. Respondent . . . is hereby perpetually enjoined from playing 'Little Old Lady'
for the purpose of annoying and disturbing Mrs. Walter E. Broadbelt
86 See note 29, supra.
87 Cardozo, J., in Shephard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 106 (1933).
8 This argument seems to have been pressed in Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 148 A.
694 (1930), but with no success.
89 298 Pa. 475, 148 A. 695 (1930).
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necessary relation between the acts . . . and the basic principles which underlie
nuisances." In Dennis v. Eckhardt,40 the distinction between a nuisance in fact
and a nuisance per se was said to lie "not ... in the remedy, but only in the
proof of it."
The law of nuisance would probably be much more understandable ii the
terms nuisance per se and nuisance in fact were forgotten.
THE RESTATEMENT
The approach to the private nuisance problem employed by the American
Law Institute represents a return to basic concepts by substituting concise, simple
and clear rules for the prevailing vague and often incomprehensible definitions. 4'
The distinction between trespass and private nuisance is faithfully preserved.
The rules governing liability for trespassory invasion of another's land are set
forth elsewhere in the Restatement4 and are referred to in Chapter 40 only by
cross reference.4 3 The term "nuisance" has been ruthlessly discarded.
44
"The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use
and enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules govern-
ing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous con-
duct." 45
A non-trespassory invasion is one which is not incidental to or which does
not result from or accompany an unprivileged entry or intrusion on the land.
46 If
A stands on his land and fires a bullet over B's land, that would be a trespassory
invasion which would be actionable under another section 47 of the Restatement;
but if A merely stands on his land and beats a brass drum to tht annoyance of B,
that would be a non-trespassory invasion of B's interest in the use and enjoyment
of his land and section 822 would apply.
If A purposely diverts a stream of water upon B's land, flooding it, that
would constitute a trespassory invasion of B's interest in unmolested possession
40 3 Grant 390 (Pa. 1862).
41 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §822 (1939).
42 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 9§157-215 (1934).
48 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §822, comment c (1939).
44 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 215-216 (1939).
46 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §822 (t939).
46 Id.'§822, comment c.
47 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §158 (1934); Id. §158, comment h.
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and incidentally would involve an interference with his interest in the use and
enjoyment of property. Nevertheless, A's liability to B would be determined by
reference to the section defining liability for intentional trespasses,4 8 although
B could recover damages for the invasion of his interest in the use and enjoyment
of the land.
49
If A negligently swerves off the highway in his car, crashes into B's house
causing a kerosene lamp to explode which in turn burns down the house, no one
would question that B's interest in the use and enjoyment of his property has been
invaded; but A's liability in this case again would not be determined by section
82250 since the invasion was trespassory in nature. B's rights would be governed
by section 165,1 the rule defining liability for unintended trespassory invasions.
An intentional, non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is actionable under section 822 if it was unreasonable.52 The
unreasonableness of the actor's conduct is determined objectively53 through a proc-
ess of balancing the utility of the conduct against the gravity of harm.54
In appraising the gravity of the harm, the factors to be considered are the
extent of the harm involved, 55 the character of the harm,"r the social value which
the law attached to the type of use or enjoyment invaded,5 7 the suitability of the
particular use invaded to the character of the locality, 8 and the burden on the
person harmed of avoiding the harm.
59
The utility of the actor's conduct is evaluated through considering the social
value which the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct,60 the suitability
of the conduct to the character of the locality, 6' and the impracticability of pre-
venting or avoiding the invasion.
62
For present purposes our discussion will be limited to a consideration of the
rule of section 822 that liability exists where the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing
liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct. Since most invasions
of the private use and enjoyment of land are intentional, special emphasis will be
placed on the problem of determining when intentional conduct is unreasonable.
48 Ibid.
49 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 225 (1939); Id. §822, comment c.
S0 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §822 (1939).
51 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §165 (1934).
52 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 1822 (d) (i) (1939).
5B Id. §826, comment c.
54 Id. 1826.
55 Id. 1827 (a).
56 Id. 1827 (b).
57 Id. 1827 (c).
58 Id. §827 (d).
59 Id. §827 (e).
00 Id. §828 (a).
61 Id. 1828 (b).
62 Id. §828 (c).
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This discussion will furthermore be restricted in scope primarily to actions
at law since the confusion is there much more pronounced than in the equity suits.
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES
From the standpoint of the student, who has before him a copy of the result
of the labors of the American Law Institute, the Pennsylvania courts have been
guilty of errors that fall into four principal categories:
(1) Private nuisance has been treated as a separate kind of liability-forming
conduct in itself, and has been subjected to an attempt to contrast it with neg-
ligence.
(2) The distinction between trespass and nuisance has been ignored, and
thus private nuisance has not been limited to non-trespassory invasions of interests
in the use and enjoyment of land.
(3) The courts in actions at law have failed either by definition or rule to
focus attention to and place appropriate emphasis upon the unreasonableness of
the defendant's intentional conduct in determining liability.
(4) The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity has been
ignored in the citation of precedents. 68
In contradistinction to the precision of the Restatement, the attempts at defini-
tion and codification by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have proven to be un-
workable tools. Certainly the recent definition of a nuisance in Kramer v. Pitts-
burgh Coal Company64 far from concisely describes what the Pennsylvania courts
have considered to be a nuisance.
But the failure to provide a rule does not mean that the Pennsylvania courts
have left us wholly without any means of discovering, with some degree of cer-
tainty, what decision may be expected on a given set of facts. Nor does it follow
that the above enumerated errors make it impossible to reconcile many of the de-
cided cases with the Restatement. A skillful workman with imperfect tools may,
nevertheless, perform his work creditably.
a. The Natural Use Test
In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson, 5 it was held that where a mine
owner in pumping water from his mine pollutes a nearby stream in the process,
he will not be held liable for the pollution to a down-river owner. This decision
was predicated upon four propositions: (1) the defendant in mining the coal
was making a natural use of the land; (2) coal could not be mined unless water
is pumped up from the lower levels; (3) personal inconveniences must yield to
63 See note 24, supra.
64 341 Pa. 379, 19 A.2d 362 (1941).
65 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
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the necessities of a great industry; and (4) the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher6 was
not applicable, but even if it were, the court was "... unwilling to recognize the
arbitrary and absolute rule of responsibility it decares .. ."67 The Sanderson case
was followed in principle in Clause v. Crowe,68 where th mine operator was held
not liable despite the fact that the water which was pumped out flowed over the
plaintiff's land and killed the vegetation, the water being acidulous. And a mine
owner who withdrew water from a surface owner's spring has been held not liable
since the extraction of minerals involves some unavoidable interference with sub-
terranean waters.
6 9
Although it apparently was at first thought that the natural use theory would
insulate a land owner from all liability, it was soon held that if he negligently
permits coal dust to escape onto adjoining land,70 or deposits culm on a river bank
so that it will be washed downstream by ordinary high water,71 or throws culm
directly into a stream,7 2 or negligently causes salt wattr to rise up into the surface
owner's well, 73 he must respond in damages. The actor must exercise reasonable
care to avoid the injury.
74
b. Non-natural Uses
Wh'ere the defendant engages in what the courts have denominated as a non-
natural use of his land, the question of liability pivots, say the courts, not upon
negligence but nuisance.7 5 Thus, where smoke fumes from a refinery'$ or zinc
plant 77 injure nearby land, or oil seeps from a tank into adjoining soil,78 or where
vibrations 79 and "noisome" smells80 make a neighbor's enjoyment of his land im-
possible, the courts have imposed liability on the theory that the question of ngli-
gence is not in the case. Similarly, if a person imports coal from off the land on
which his coke ovens are situated, he will b'e held liable without proof of negli-
66 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
67 113 Pa. at 154, 6 A. at 463.
68 68 Pa. Super. 248 (1917).
69 Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875).
70 Harvey v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63, 50 A. 770 (1902).
71 Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490, 27 A. 545 (1893).
72 Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa. 138, 33 A. 74 (1895).
78 Collins v. Chartiers Valley Coal Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890).
74 Musleva v. Clay Mfg. Co. (No. 1), 338 Pa. 249, 12 A.2d. 554 (1940); Venzel v. Val.
ley Camp Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583. 156 A. 240 (1931).
76 Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861).
76 Green v. Sun Company, 32 Pa. Super. 521 (1907).
77 Procz v. American Steel & Wire Co., 318 Pa. 395, 176 A. 679 (1935); Thompson v.
American Steel & Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7. 175 A. 541 (1934); Burkhardt v. American Steel & Wire
Co., 74 Pa. Super. 437 (1920) (personal injuries and land damage); Graff v. American Steel &
Wire Co.. 91 P.L.J. 159 (Pa. 1943).
7 Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 186 Pa. 604, 40 A. 834 (1898) Hauck v. Tidewater
Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
79 Ganster v. Metropolitan Electric Co., 214 Pa. 628, 64 A. 91 (1906); Rogers v. Phil-
adelphia Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473, 38 A. 399 (1897).
S0 Siwak v. Borough of Rankin, 72 Pa. Super. 218 (1919).
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gence for damage to his neighbor's land.8 ' A similar result was reached on the
same theory in a case where the defendant purchased limestone elsewhere and
pulverized it on his land, causing dust to settle on the plaintiff's trees and vegeta-
tion.8
2
c. The Railroad Cases
In Pennsylvania Railroad v. Lippincott,88 the plaintiff was a nighboring
landowner whose property was constantly buffeted by cinders and smoke from the
defendant's trains. After observing that the railroad would not be liable for dam-
age caused by dust if it moved the freight by dray horses along a dusty road, the
court felt that the railroad should not be any more subject to liability if, in using
land appropriated under a power of eminent domain, it caused the same amount
of damage by a different method. ThL fact that operating trains involves a non-
natural use of the land which would subject the defendant to the rigors of the
"not a question of negligence but of nuisance" rule of Pottstown Gar Co. v.
Murphy8l was not discussed, although plaintiff's counsel contended that the court
had before it a nuisance case.
The Lippincott case was subsequently distinguished in Hauck v. Tidewater
Pipe Line Co."' on the ground that there the oil company was "clothed with no
such powers" of eminent domain. So also, in Ganster v. Metropolitan Electric
Co.,86 where the defendant had acquired property adjoining plaintiff's land and
erected electrical machinery which caused vibrations which made plaintiff's home
practically uninhabitable, the court held that notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant had appropriated its land under a power of eminent domain, the de-
fendant has committed an "actionable nuisance for which it is liable." Said the
Court:
"This case is not ruled by Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Lip-
pincott, 116 Pa. 472, and Pennsylvania Railroad v. Marchant, 119 Pa.
541, relied on by the defendant's counsel to support his position. In
those cases the injuries were caused by the noise, smoke and dust from
the defendant company's engines and cars used in operating its railroad
on a viaduct on its own land on the opposite side of a street from the
81 Lentz v. Carnegie Bros., 145 Pa. 612, 23 A. 219 (1892); Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 145
Pa. 324, 22 A. 649 (1891); Campbell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374 (1903).
82 Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 94 Pa. Super 318 (1927) ("the use which the
defendant is making of its land is an artificial one .... "). For other cases in which the non-
natural use test was applied, see Vautier v. Atlantic Rofining Co., 231 Pa. 8, 79 A. 814 (1911) ;
Welliver v. Irondale Electric Co., 38 Pa. Super. 26 (1909): "The race is an artificial water
course; it is not maintained for the development of natural resources of the land . . .but for
the purpose of supplying power .... ." Id. at 31. Contra: Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v.
Goldstein, 125 Pa. 246, 17 A. 442 (1889) (damages caused by seepage from a canal are ".. in
the absence of malice or negligence . . . damnum adsque injuria .... ").
88 116 Pa. 472. 9 A. 871 (1887). Accord: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Marchant, 119
Pa. 541, 13 A. 690 (1888).
84 39 Pa. 257 (1861).
85 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
86 214 Pa. 628, 64 A. 91 (1906).
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plaintiff's premises. Here the defendant company erected its plant on
land purchased for the purpose and in immediate contact with the plain-
tiff's buildings and so constructed the foundation and floor of its building
that the operation of the heavy machinery resulted directly in destroying
the use of the plaintiff's buildings. It is therefore apparent and needs
no argument to show that the defendant's contention in the case in hand
finds no support in the Lippincott and Marchant cases." 81
EVALUATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA TECHNIQUE
USED IN NUISANCE CASES
a. Contrasting Nuisance with Negligence
In the Kramer case the court said that "nuisance is distinguishable from neg-
ligence," quoting Corpus Juris for this authority.8 8 It has already been pointed
out that an attempt to distinguish nuisance from negligence involves a failure to
recognize that, properly speaking, negligence has reference to a type of conduct
whereas nuisance has reference to a type of interest invaded by any kind of liabil-
ity-forming conduct. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania courts, not only by accept-
ing the ambiguous definition in the Kramer case but in addition by adhering to
the anachronistic rule of Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy, 9 have definitely
committed a basic error in failing to recognize this distinction between a type of
conduct and a type of interest invaded.
It is interesting to note the manner in which this "not a question of negli-
gence but of nuisance" rule became 'embedded in Pennsylvania law. In the Mur-
phy case, the Supreme Court affirmed, in a brief opinion, a judgment for the plain-
tiff, saying that "the [lower court] was right in saying that this was not a question
of negligence but of nuisance, for so is the declaration."90 Is it possible that a
label affixed to a pleading nearly a century ago had something to do with the failure
of the Pennsylvania courts to recognize that the thing which gives unity to the
field of private nuisance is the interest invaded, not the kind of conduct which
injures the plaintiff's interests?91
In early tort law the rule of strict liability prevailed. An actor was liable
for the harm caused by his acts whether that harm was done intentionally, negli-
gently or accidentally. In course of time the law came to take into consideration
87 Id. at 632-633, 64 A. at 93.
88 See note 10 supra.
89 39 Pa. 257 (1861).
90 Id. at 263. Emphasis added.
91 To the effect that this trap has been sprung on courts in other jurisdictions, see Prosser,
Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx L. REv. 399 (1942): "'Therefore, as the old reporters would
say, Note, reader, that he who seeks recovery in Texas without proof of . . . negligence would
do well to cast his petition in the form of an allegation of nuisance." Id. at 426. See, also, Note,
Negligence or Nuisance - A Study in the Tyranny of Labels, 24 IND. L. J. 402 (1949). For
other Pennsylvania cases in which it was expressly admitted that the nuisance label requires spec-
ial treatment, see Forster v. Rogers Bros., 247 Pa. 54, 93 A. 26 (1916) ; Stokes v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, 214 Pa. 415, 63 A. 1028 (1906) ("The action being fog damages occasioned by main.
tenance of a nuisance, the questior of negligence is not involved").
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not only the harm inflicted, but also the type of conduct that caused it, in determin-
ing liability. This change came later in the law of private nuisance than in other
fields. Private nuisance was remediable by an action on the case irrespective of
the type of conduct involved. Thus, the form of action did not call attention to
the change from strict liability to liability based on conduct.92
The development and reaffirmance of the "not a question of negligence but
of nuisance" rule of Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy is representative of a
failure on the part of the Pennsylvania courts to recognize this change.9 8 They
have fallen into the habit of thinking that a private nuisance involves a separate
kind of strict liability. In Stokes v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,94 Gavigan v. At-
latic Refining Co.,95 and Farver v. American Car & Foundry Co.,96 it was held
that the only questions for a jury to decide in a nuisance case are whether the de-
fendant caused the injury and the extent of the damages. Moreover, in Hauck v.
Tidewater Pipe Line Co.,97 the following charge, which, literally was lifted ver-
batim out of Rylands v. Fletcher,98 was approved:
"Every person who, for his own profit or advantage brings upon
his premises and collects and keeps there anything which if it escapes
will do damage to another, is liable for all the consequences of his acts,
and is bound at his peril to confine it and keep it upon his premises. If
he does not, he is answerable for all the damages that result therefrom,
without any reference to the degree of care or skill exercised by him in
reference thereto." 99
Surprisingly, this approval came but five years after the Sanderson ca.e,
where the court had said that it was ". . . unwilling to recognize the arbitrary and
absolute rule of responsibility ... 100 formulated in Rylands v. Fletcher.
b. Ignoring the Distinction between Trespass and Nuisance
Again referring to the Kramer case, the Supreme Court there said that "the
distinction between trespass and nuisance consists in the former being a direct
92 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 221 (1939).
98 But Chief Justice Kephart recognized this change in 1939 when he said: "In our State, the
doctrine of absolute liability has been involved, almost without exception, only in that small group
of actions which redress injuries to land, and it is only as to these that it can be fairly said
that the doctrine prevails. This liability is a survival of the medieval law dicated by the landlord,
in which the protection of the uninterrupted enjoyment of real property was a primary con-
sideration . . . It was in the Nineteenth Century that the law of negligence in torts had its develop-
ment. Personal injury cases then consumed the greater portion of the time of the courts. 'Cases con-
cerning rights in land yielded their earlier prominence, and the rules of law applicable to them
have consequently remained, in the most part, unchanged, even to the present day." Summit
Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 186-187, 8 A.2d 302, 304 (1939).
94 214 Pa. 415, 63 A. 1028 (1906).
96 186 Pa. 604, 40 A. 834 (1898).
96 24 Pa. Super. 579 (1904).
97 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
99 L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866) (". . . the person who for his own purposes brings on 'his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at
his peril . . .").
99 153 Pa. at 369-370.
100 113 Pa. 126, 154, 6 A. 453, 463 (1886).
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infringement of one's right of property, while, in the latter, the infringement is
the result of an act which is not wrongful in itself but only in the consequences
which may flow from it."
Since the right of use and enjoyment of land is as much a "right of property"
as the right of possession, the definition completely ignores the basic distinction
between the two types of injury. Provided the infringement is "direct," it is,
under the definition, a trespass without considering whether it involves possession
or use and enjoyment. And the intended meaning of the word "direct" is obscure.
One would normally think that most nuisances are "direct" infringements of one's
use and enjoyment of land. The word, therefore, seems to have been ill-chosen.
Only if it be interpreted to apply to those situations in which the actor causes some
physical thing to infringe the possession of another can the term be said to have
been validly used.
Moreover, the Kramer definition of nuisance seems to imply that every act
which results in harm, whether wrongful or not, constitutes a nuisance. Clearly
this is wrong under the Restatement. And under the Pennsylvania decisions even
intentional acts which result in harm are not always actionable nuisances.
But regardless of how this Pennsylvania definition is interpreted, the Penn-
sylvania courts have failed to adhere to any acceptable distinction between tres-
pass and nuisance.
In Stokes v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,101 the defendant's employees emptied
acid jars over a fence onto plaintiff's land, rendering it arid and killing his cows.
Said the court, in reversing a judgment for defendant: "The action being for
damages occasioned by maintenance of a nuisance, the question of negligence was
not involved." 102  And the court thought that the question of nuisance was in-
volved in Forster v. Rogers Bros.,1°3 where the defendant stored some dynamite
in the plaintiff's house without her permission; the house was wrecked by an ex-
plbsion. Here were cases involving a direct infringement of the plaintiff's pos-
sessory rights in the strictest sense but still the court talked nuisance law. The
seepage of ammonia into a neighbor's well, 10' the emission of clouds of limestone
dust which settles on adjoining land,105 the escape of water from a mill race, 106
and the leakage of oil from tanks' 07 have been described as nuisances, although
such invasion definitely would be trespassory under the Restatement and thus not
properly nuisances.
101 214 Pa. 415, 63 A. 1028 (1906).
102 Id. at 419, 63 A. at 1030.
108 247 Pa. 54, 93 A. 26 (1915).
104 Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861).
105 Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 94 Pa. Super. 321 (1927) (by implication).
106 Welliver v. Irondale Electric Co., 38 Pa. Super. 26 (1909).
107 Gavigan v. Atlantic RefininS Co., 186 Pa. 604, 40 A. 834 (1898).
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c. The Failure to Focus Attention by Definition or Rule upon the, Reasonableness
of Intentional Conduct
By far the greater number of Pennsylvania nuisance cases involve intentional
harm from the defendant's continuing activity. Although the first invasion may
be purely unintentional, conduct which is continued with the knowledge that
harm is resulting therefrom constitutes an intentional invasion of the interest of
a person whose land is being affected by the activity. 108
This apparent indifference to the reasonableness of the actor's intentional
conduct in the imposition of liability stems primarily from a misunderstanding
of the decision in the Sanderson case. 109 There, it will be recalled, the court
pointed out that the mine operator, in pumping out mine water, was making a
"natural use" of his land. It is quite apparent, however, that the court was really
balancing the gravity of the harm against the utility of the intentional conduct:
"The plaintiff's grievance, is for a mere personal inconvenience, and we are of
the opinion that mere private personal inconvenience arising this way and under
such circumstances, must yield to the necessities of a great public industry, which
although in the hands of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest.
To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a country, trifling
inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities
of a great community." 110
Not long after the Sanderson case was decided, the courts commenced to
apply the "not a question of negligence but of nuisance" rule according to whether
the defendant was making a natural or non-natural use of the land.11 ' Most of
these cases involved intentional harm from continuing activity. A reliance upon
the natural or non-natural use tests seemingly channelized the courts' attention
into a highly technical scrutiny of what the defendant was doing in relation to
his land, rather than the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his conduct.
A RECONCILIATION WITH THE RESTATEMENT
Unquestionably the defendant in the Sanderson case knew to a substantial
certainty that when he pumped mine water into the stream, he would render it
unfit for drinking purposes. But the primary purpose of the conduct, the extrac-
tion of a great mineral resource, was high in social value to the Pennsylvania
community. Similarly, mining coal was suitable to the character of the locality.
So also, the defendant pointed out that he could not get rid of the mine water
except by pumping it into the stream. On the other hand, however, the gravity
of the harm to the plaintiff was not serious. Presumably, drinking water was
available elsewhere; and the fact that plaintiff was deprived of the pleasure of
108 RESTATEMINT, ToRTS §825, comment b (1939).
109 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
110 Id. at 149, 6 A. at 459.
111 See notes 65-82 supra.
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having fish in her backyard pool was of little importance when contrasted with
the tremendous economic benefit accruing to citizens of Pennsylvania through
the exploitation of their great mineral resources. Hence, the court balanced the
utility of the conduct against the gravity of the harm.
It was not long after the Sanderson case that the court held that merely be-
cause the exploiter of the mineral estate is 'engaged in an activity of great utility,
it does not imply that he will not be held to a standard of due care in his conduct.
Hence, if he bombards his neighbor's land with coal dust from a breaker, he must
use all practical care to avoid the injury,112 Similarly, the decision in Elder v.
Lykens Valley Coal Co.113 and Hindson v, Markleu 4 would have required the
same result under section 165 of the Restatement since those trespassory invasions
were caused by negligent conduct.
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Sagamore Coal Co." 5 involved intentional, un-
avoidable harm to other riparian owners. There the coal company, like the de-
fendant in the Sanderson case, pumped mine water into a stream, polluting it.
The railroad and two water companies used the stream to supply trains and tht
public with water. A suit in equity was brought to enjoin the pollution, and the
injunctive process was issued. Thus when the interests of a large segment of the
public were coupled with the interests of an industry of equal stature to coal min-
ing, the court found that the defendant's continued activity was unreasonable
under the circumstances. In other words, the gravity of the harm outweighed
the utility of the defendant's conduct.
In the non-natural use cases, where the courts have applied the rule of Potts-
town Gas Company v. Murphy, the invasions were almost without exception
caused by intentional conduct since the defendants knew that harm was flowing
from their activity. Hence, the decisions in those cases will be tested by balancing
the utility of the conduct against the gravity of the harm, to ascertain whether
the same result would have been reached under th- Restatement.
(1) The Smoke Damage Cases
In many of the smoke and fume damage cases which were examined, the
statement of facts was not sufficiently comprehensive to permit an application of
all the factors enumerated in sections 827 and 828. A good example is Robb v.
Carnegie Bros.11 There the defendant was engaged in farming but the facts
failed to show whether th'e area was predominantly agricultural. The court did,
however, point out that the site selected by the defendant to construct his coke
oven was "as well adapted to the business, and as remote from dwellings as any
112 Harvey v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63, 50 A. 770 (1902).
113 157 Pa. 490, 27 A. 545 (1893).
114 171 Pa. 138, 33 A. 74 (1895).
115 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
116 145 Pa. 324, 22 A. 649 (1891).
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in that region." Fumes from the ovens, for which coal was imported from off
the land, attacked the plaintiff's fruit trees and vegetables. In this case, therefore,
the factors on the side of the plaintiff were that the harm was substantial, that
he was engaged in farming to which the law has traditionally accorded a high
social value, 117 and that he could not have avoided the harm.
For the defendant it was apparent that he could not have avoided the harm
except at prohibitive cost,'1 " that he was engaged in manufacturing to which the
law also ascribes a high social value, and that the conduct apparently was suited
to the locality.
Hence, the factors in favor of each are relatively equal. However, the Re-
statement points out that the enumerated factors are by no means intended to be
exclusive, 119 but that the reasonableness of the invasion may be determined ob-
jectively through an analysis of the particular facts of each case.
120
The court held the defendant liable and relied upon the fact that the de-
fendant selected the site for his activity, knowing that the plaintiff was certain
to be harmed thereby. In this way and others the Sanderson case was distinguished.
Since the Restatement permits in the determination of reasonableness th-
application of factors not specifically enumerated, an adoption of the factor relied
upon by the court in the Robb case could produce the same result under the Re-
statement.
At this point it is pertinent to observe that in the smoke fume cases, as in
other cases to which the non-natural use theory has been applied, the courts will
exclude evidence from the defendant that he used all practical means to avoid
the injury.12' This follows as of course from an application of the "not a ques-
tion of negligence but of nuisance" rule. Since these cases involved injuries from
intentional conduct, negligence is not in them.' 22 Even under the Restatement, evi-
dence offered by defendant to show that he had exercised due care would not
be admissible, although evidence of the expense and inconvenience of avoiding
the injury would be admissible as a factor in determining reasonableness.
(2) Seepage of Oil or Water
Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co.'z 8 was a case in which the facts suggest
that the defendant continued its activity although it knew that harm was resulting
117 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 1828, Comment e (1939).
118 This point was not enunciated by the court but the factssuggest it.
119 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 1827, comment a (1939).
120 Id. 826, comments b and d (1939).
121 See, e.g., Vautier v. Atlantic Refining Co., 231 Pa. 8, 14, 79 A. 814, 815 (1911):
"The third and eighth assignments relate to the exclusion of evidence that the defendant used
the most effective and approved appliances. But the excluded evidence would be material only
as to the question of negligence; and, as we have pointed out, that is not important here."
122 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §828, comment g (1939).
123 153 Pa, 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
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therefrom. Oil from the defendant's tanks seeped into the plaintiff's land, ruining
some springs and a fish pond. The court held the defendant liable without proof
of negligence.
The seepage of oil, in this case, into the plaintiff's land amounted to a tres-
passory invasion of his interest of possession, with incidental damage to his in-
terest in the use and enjoyment of land. Hence this trespassory factor would re-
quire an application of section 158, rather than section 822. Under section 158,
every intentional, trespassory invasion is actionable unless the defendant can point
to a privilege to avoid liability. Since there appears to be no privilege to avoid
the imposition of liability, it follows that had the rules of the Restatement been
applied, the result would have been harmonious with that reached by the court.
The court in Pennsylvania Railroad v. Lippincott 24 predicated its decision
upon the ground of eminent domain and thus placed itself in a rather tenuous
position for subsequent cases in which non-railroad defendants attempted to in-
voke the eminent domain rule to obtain immunity from damages.1 25 However,
the result seems correct in principle when tested by the rules of the Restatement.
When a railroad is chartered to construct a line between two points, it is
limited in choice as to what land should be appropriated in its path. In this re-
spect, therefore, the construction and operation of a railroad is essentially similar
to the 'extraction of coal from the earth; the site of the activity is restricted by
nature in the former and by physical requirements in the latter. It is quite likely
that the court in the Lippincott case was strongly influenced by this factor even
though the opinion emphasizes eminent domain.
Another, and even stronger, reason for non-liability in the Lippincott case
is the fact that the railroad industry has unquestionably played a major role in the
economic development of the State of Pennsylvania. And, of course, to award
damages in that case for unavoidable harm caused by the operation of a railroad
would have set a dangerous precedent for every landowner along the line who
fancied that his property was depreciating at an inordinate rate by virtue of smoke
from passing trains. A decision in favor of liability in the Lippincott case might
have resulted in putting the railroad out of business.
Accordingly, it may well be concluded that in the light of these facts the
Lippincott decision stands for no more than that the harm caused by the defend-
ant's activity was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
SUMMARY
Consistently in cases in which the defendant is engaged in a natural use of
his land and in the railroad cases, the Pennsylvania courts have refused to apply
124 116 Pa. 472, 9 A. 871 (1887).
125 Ganster v. Metropolitan Electric Co., 214 Pa. 628, 64 A. 91 (1906); Hauck v. Tide-
water Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
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the rule of strict liability; the Supreme Court has expressly repudiated the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher. And although they seem to have been consistent in their
adherence to the rule of strict liability in non-natural use cases, analysis reveals
that this adherence is partly artificial. The courts have avoided the application of
the strict rule by ignoring the basic concept that nuisance law is limited in its ap-
plication to but includes all cases which involve an invasion of the right of use
and enjoyment of land; they have frequently applied the rule "not a question of
negligence but of nuisance" in reverse by treating as negligence cases many of
which are properly nuisance cases. And they have applied the rule of strict liability
in cases which they regarded as nuisance cases but which were in reality trespass
cases.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania courts have, in a crude and somewhat clumsy
way, permitted such valid questions as the utility of defendant's conduct and the
counterbalancing gravity of harm to the plaintiff to be smuggled into the case by
submitting to the jury the issues of nuisance under a charge which often, although
not always, presents to them the question of reasonableness.'
2 6
We believe that the Pennsylvania courts could accept and use the rules of
the Restatement without doing violence to precedent, without much concern about
stare decisis. These rules are much better implements than the awkward, vague
and often inadequate tools which the courts have been using.
The adoption of the rules of the Restatement would result in the trial of cases
involving the invasion of the right of use and enjoyment of land on the basis of
rules which would be as clearly understood as the rules applicable to other branches
of tort law. As in those other branches, it would mean that the vast majority of
cases would involve issues of fact for the jury or for the judge, sitting without 2L
jury. It would mean the abandonment of the artificial significance that has been
attached to the natural use of land as distinguished from its non-natural use. The
emphasis would shift to an inquiry into the utility of th'e defendant's conduct
evaluated by testing broader concepts of social value, suitability and practicability
of prevention. It would recognize that manufacturing in its many phases has risen
to an economic stature equal to that of mining and railroading. In a word, it would
help to remove from the Pennsylvania law of nuisance the cloak of mystery which
now envelops it.
126 See, e.g., the charge which was approved in Amsterdam v. Dupont Powder Company,
62 Pa. Super. 314 (1916): "Now you will see, therefore, that nuisance as we are talking about
it, as it was used in this case, and as being used by me is that harm and injury, which one does
to another, must be an unreasonable and unwarrantable injury." Id. at 316.
